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Qu'est-ce que Ie moi? 
Un homme qui se met a Ia fenetre pour voir Ies 
passants; si je passe par la, puis-je dire qu'il s'est 
mis Ia pour me voir? Non; car il ne pense pas a 
moi en particulier; mais celui qui aime quelqu'un 
a cause de sa beaute, l'aime-t-iI? Non; car Ia petite 
verole, qui tuera Ia beaute sans tuer Ia personne, 
fera qu'il ne I'aimera plus. 
Et si on m'aime pour mon jugement, pour rna 
memoire, m'aime-t-on? moi?Non, car je puis perdre 
ces qualites sans me perdre moi-meme. Oil est donc 
ce moi, s'il n'est ni dans Ie corps, ni dans l'ame? et 
comment aimer Ie corps ou I'ame, sinon pour ces 
qualites, qui ne seront point ce qui fait Ie moi, 
puisqu'elles sont perissables? car aimerait-on Ia 
substance de I'ame d'une personne, abstraitement, 
et quelques qualites qui y fussent? Cela ne se peut, 
et serait injuste. On n'aime donc jamais personne, 
mais seulement des qualites. 
Blaise Pascal 
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PREFACE 
The subject of this book is the first person in thought and language. The 
main question concerns what we mean when we say 'J'. Related to it are 
questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are 
needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The 
emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'J', but a fair amount 
of space is devoted to 'I' -thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in 
cognition. 
The purpose is to give a picture of how we think and talk about ourselves 
in a wide range of circumstances. The topic has been discussed in numerous 
articles during the last decades, but rarely in the form of a monograph. I felt 
the need for a book of this kind while working on my dissertation. The 
manuscript is the result of many years of reflection on the self and indexicals. 
Some of the theories that I advance have developed as a result of my teaching 
an undergraduate course in the philosophy of language the last couple of 
years. 
In the book, several different issues are brought together in order to give 
a coherent theory of 'J', pertaining both to the philosophy of language and 
the philosophy of mind. Among these, the reader will find the immunity to 
error through misidentification that is exhibited by 'I' in some of its uses, the 
relation between direct reference, rigid designation, and essentialism, the 
role that non-conceptual content plays to cognition, and the nature of the 
unity of consciousness and personal identity. The idea has been rather to 
give a wide/broad picture of 'I' and 'I'-thoughts than to treat exhaustively 
every particular issue that is raised. 
The main thesis is that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense to the 
speaker as presented in the context of utterance. 'I' also expresses a stable 
individual concept. How the information expressed by the de re sense is 
gained is explained by a theory of non-conceptual content. Further, it is 
argued that the concept of a speaker is intertwined with the concept of a 
person. Persons are such that they can self-ascribe and be ascribed both 
mental and bodily predicates and that they can think about themselves from 
both a first-person and a third-person perspective. 
The book is intended for philosophers in general, especially those interested 
in matters having to do with the concept of the self or the concept of a 
person and those with a general interest in the philosophy of language. The 
text is also accessible to graduate students and advanced undergraduates. 
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